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Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and
Security: Legal Issues Surrounding the
Collection of Intelligence from
Beyond the Littoral
Stuart Kaye*
Introduction
Hugo Grotius, in his work Mare Liberum, asserted that the world's oceans were
free and incapable of acquisition by states. His work sparked a debate in the
seventeenth century as to the freedom of the seas, and whether states could
exclude the vessels of other states from certain waters. Grotius' viewpoint
ultimately prevailed, and is still prevalent within the law of the sea. Greater
security concerns of states since 11 September 2001, have raised questions as to
the current extent of the doctrine of freedom of navigation, and whether the old
norm remains intact. This article will consider this issue, and determine if the
right to navigate freely across the world's oceans has been circumscribed. It
will also attempt to apply the law to the collision of United States of America
and Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea.

Historical Background
Freedom of navigation has its origins in Hugo Grotius' response to the Spanish
and Portuguese claims of control over the oceans and territories outside of
Europe by virtue of the Papal Bull1 and Treaty of Tordesillas. 2 These
documents purported not only to give control over territory outside of Europe,
but also provided for exclusive seabome trading rights in the South Atlantic
and Indian Oceans. 3 In reaction to this assertion, Grotius produced his seminal
work, Mare Liberum, asserting that the oceans were incapable of appropriation
by states, and that the ships of any state could journey anywhere on the world's
4
oceans.
In the modern law of the sea, freedom of navigation was equally perceived
as important, and this status is reflected in the now superseded Geneva
*
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Bull Inter Caetera of Pope Alexander VI, (4 May 1493) <http://bullsburning.
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itgo.com/essays/Caetera.htm#theBull>.
Treaty of Tordesillas, (7 June

modeur/mod00 I.htm>.

1494) <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/

C J Colombos, The InternationalLaw of the Sea (6th ed, 1967) 48-49; H Caminos,
'Sources of the Law of the Sea' in R-J Dupuy and D Vignes (eds), A Handbook of
the New Law of the Sea (1991) 29, 64-65.
H Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (reprinted 1952).
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Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Article 14 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone guaranteed a right of innocent passage to
vessels, non-suspendable for waters in international straits, and article 23
indicated explicitly that such rights were available to warships. 5 Freedom of
navigation on the high seas was guaranteed in article 2 of the Convention on the
High Seas, 6 with article 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention ensuring that the
status of waters above a state's continental shelf remained as high seas, and
7
therefore enjoying freedom of navigation.
These efforts had been prefaced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in 1949, in the Corfu Channel Case, which confirmed the right of innocent
passage, available even to warships, passing through 'straits used for
international navigation'. In resolving the case, the Court was obliged to
consider inter alia the definition of an international strait, and the nature of
innocent passage through such straits. The portion of the Channel that had been
mined was within Albania's territorial sea, so the legality of the passage of the
ships was directly in issue. Albania had argued that British warships had no
right to pass through the Channel because it was not an essential or significant
international thoroughfare. 8 The Court rejected this view emphatically, noting
that the volume of traffic through the strait did not demote its character as an
international strait. Rather it noted that the decisive factors were that it was a
body of water connecting two parts of the high seas 9 and that it was being used
for international navigation. Although the level of shipping activity through the
Corfu Channel was not great, the Court was satisfied that it was used by vessels
under a variety of flags, and thereby it qualified as an international strait.10
The Court was also prepared to state that foreign vessels, including
warships, had a right of innocent passage during peacetime through all
international straits. Further this right existed without the necessity of the
foreign vessel obtaining prior authorisation to pass through. Such a right
existed as a result of international custom, and existed even during the state of
11
high tension that existed between Greece and Albania, the two littoral states.
The Court was also satisfied that the passage of the warships, even to test
whether Albania would fire upon them, was still innocent, as although the ships
were at action stations, their guns were trained fore and aft as for normal
cruising.
The current 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 12 maintains the
approaches found in the Corfu Channel Case and the Geneva Law of the Sea
5
6
7
8
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Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (29 April 1958), 516
UNTS 205.
Convention on the High Seas (29 April 1958), 450 UNTS 82.
Convention on the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958), 499 UNTS 311.
Corfu Channel Case (UnitedKingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 28.
The waters of the Adriatic Sea were still regarded in 1949 as high seas, as the
territorial sea was generally no more than three-to-four nautical miles in breadth,
and the EEZ was still some decades from international acceptance.
Above n 8 28-29.
Ibid 28.

Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982), 1833 UNTS 397.
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Conventions. It deals with navigation in two distinct contexts. First, it examines
freedom of navigation in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. Three
passage regimes are established in these waters: innocent passage, transit
passage, pertaining to straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic
sealanes passage. It then moves to consider freedom of navigation in areas
beyond national sovereignty. It is profitable to examine each in turn before
considering whether the Convention's structure within the United Nations (UN)
system may impose its own limitations on navigation for surveillance purposes.

Navigation in Areas under National Sovereignty
The Law of the Sea Convention divides the world's oceans into maritime zones,
based on the distance a particular location is from the nearest land. Waters
closest to the coast, are susceptible to appropriation by states as part of their
sovereignty and national airspace. Waters closest to the coast that can be
enclosed on one of the variety bases at international law, are internal waters and
are accorded the same status in terms of access as land territory. Beyond these
waters, to a maximum distance of 12 nautical miles, a coastal state may assert a
territorial sea, which is also part of its sovereignty and national airspace, but is
subject to limited use by ships of other states.
Within areas subject to national sovereignty, the Law of the Sea Convention
prescribes three types of passage by vessels, none of which require explicit
consent to be obtained by the ship concerned. The first, through the territorial
sea, is the regime of innocent passage. 13 The second, through international
straits by ships and aircraft, is the regime of transit passage, 14 while the third,
archipelagic sealanes passage is limited to travel by ships and aircraft through
archipelagic waters in certain designated lanes or routes normally used for
international navigation.t 5 Each will be considered in turn.
The regime of innocent passage deals with navigation by ships only in the
territorial sea of a coastal state, and as noted above, it retains the same approach
as that used in the Territorial Sea Convention and the Corfu Channel Case.
Article 17 of the Law of the Sea Convention grants ships the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea, while the remaining articles in part II,
section 3A of the Convention indicate how the right is circumscribed.
Essentially, vessels are required to transit in a continuous and expeditious
fashion, on the surface of the ocean. Article 19 requires that a ship's passage
cannot be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state,
and that a range of activities that fall outside this requirement be explicitly
listed, including 'any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage'.
Several points can be made in relation to intelligence gathering and innocent
passage. First, if the purpose of gathering any intelligence from a coastal state is
to prejudice its peace, good order or security, then the action could be perceived
as contrary to international law, on the basis that it is action that is associated
13

Ibid, part 11.
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Ibid part III.
Ibid part IV.
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with a possible use of force against that state. 16 The UN Charter would make
such an activity unlawful, unless it was undertaken in furtherance of action
authorised by the UN Security Council, or in self-defence. 17 The Law of the
Sea Convention clearly does not intend to facilitate intelligence gathering as a
prelude to the use of force, and this is confirmed in article 301.18 However, it is
conceivable that not all intelligence is intended to have the objective of
prejudicing international peace and security, so further consideration of
article 19 is needed.
A number of examples are given in article 19 of activities that are
inconsistent with innocent passage, and several are pertinent to intelligence
gathering activities:
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
In the context of research and survey, intelligence gathering with a view to
establishing the bathometry of the approaches to a coastal state, potentially to
utilise for landing craft at some future date will not be permissible. Similarly,
using electronic means of surveillance that interfere with communications in the
littoral state will not be consistent with the Convention. Many types of
intelligence gathering will also be matters that do not have a direct bearing on
passage, and consequently be inconsistent with international law.
However, a different question arises in the case of data obtained that is
incidental to normal navigation. Normal navigation will require some forms of
data gathering to take place. Safe operation of a ship will require it to know its
position, and also, if it is close to shore or other navigational hazards, and the
depth of water in which it is operating. Similarly, the ship may also operate
standard navigational radar, in order that it may avoid other vessels navigating
in its vicinity. Use of this equipment will mean that data may be collected by
the vessel exercising a right of innocent passage, but clearly this is data
incidental to safe navigation, and is not collected to prejudice the peace, good
order and security of the coastal state. Neither would it be practical, or even
desirable, for vessels exercising a right of innocent passage to dispose of data
collected incidental to their safe navigation through a territorial sea, even if
such data might conceivably have military application.
The issue becomes even more problematic in the context of international
straits. The Law of the Sea Convention's provisions on the question of

16
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18

In this context, it is not the act of gathering intelligence that is of itself an unlawful
act, but rather as integral part of a wider unlawful use of force.
See I A Shearer, Starke 's InternationalLaw (11 th ed, 1994) 484-90.
Art 301, Law of the Sea Convention, above n 12, provides: 'In exercising their
rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall
refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.'
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international straits and the regime of transit passage are to be found in part III.
It deals with four categories of strait:
I. Straits which are subject to international conventions of long-standing;
2. Straits subject to the regime of "transit passage";
3. International straits with other routes of similar convenience (the so-called
"Messina Exception") 19; and
4. Straits which provide access between the high20seas or an exclusive economic
zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.
The three categories other than transit passage are all ultimately subject to
innocent passage rules, which are essentially analogous to those under the
Territorial Sea Convention. Under the first category, article 35(c) was designed
to protect well-established arrangements, like those in relation to the Turkish
Straits, from being brought into question by the 1982 Convention. However
such arrangements are most unusual, and are not of general application. The
third category practically downgrades certain international straits to the status
of mere territorial waters. This can occur where the strait does not serve as a
significant route for international navigation. The rationale behind it is that if
international shipping will not be inconvenienced by the potential withdrawal
of an international strait, then there is little reason for the affected coastal state
to be burdened with having the care of an international strait.
Part III's principal focus is on stating the content of the regime of transit
passage. Such passage is defined as taking place by vessels navigating through
an international strait, from one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), to another part of the high seas or EEZ. Transit passage does not
preclude entering or leaving a state bordering the strait, subject to the entry
requirements of such a state.2 1 Passage must be without delay, threat or use of
force or any other activities apart from those necessary for normal ship (or
aircraft) operation. 22 Article 39(2) also requires compliance with general
international regulations pertaining to safety and control of pollution.
Most significant, however, is article 44, which provides that transit passage
shall not be hampered or suspended. This provision was designed to meet the
objective of the maritime powers to ensure that key international straits could
not be subject to closure. It makes it clear that under no circumstances can a
ships
coastal state block an international strait to vessels, although transiting
23
must comply with such regulations that can be validly applied to them.

19
20
21
22
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See generally L M Alexander, 'Exceptions to the Transit Passage Regime: Straits
with Routes of "Similar Convenience' (1987) 18 Ocean Development and
InternationalLaw 479.

See D R Rothwell, 'International Straits and UNCLOS: An Australian Case Study'
(1992) 23 Journalof Maritime Law and Commerce 461, 467-69.

Art 38(2), Law of the Sea Convention, above n 12.
Art 39, Law of the Sea Convention, above n 12.
J N Moore, 'The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea' (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 77,
102-105.
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The regime of innocent passage has only limited application to states used
for international navigation. Article 45 provides that straits falling within the
'Messina exception' or between the high seas or EEZ and the territorial sea of a
foreign state are subject to the regime of innocent passage. This suggests that
the range of activities permissible under the transit passage regime is wider than
under innocent passage, although the stipulation that ships and aircraft
transiting a strait shall 'refrain from any activities other than those incident to
their normal modes or continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress' would seem to indicate the
differences are minor.
The issue of what constitutes 'normal mode' is not clarified in the
24
Convention, and is an area of where states have different views. Most
archipelagic states and strait states, where a view has been expressed, have
taken the view that normal mode essentially equates to the regime of innocent
passage, albeit in a form that cannot be suspended. The maritime powers have,
by and large, adopted a view of normal mode to suggest that what constitutes
normal ship's or aircraft operation is encompassed by the concept. 25 Therefore,
if a submarine's normal mode of travel is submerged, then transit passage can
be exercised by submerged submarines. Similarly, if an aircraft-carrier battle
group normally transits the oceans with a flight overhead for its protection, then
such a flight can be launched, retained and landed as part of normal mode, even
though for the individual aircraft the passage will not be expeditious, and such
an activity would be directly inconsistent with the regime of innocent passage.
This difference in view is of direct relevance to the issue of surveillance and
freedom of navigation. In its normal operation, a warship may have a range of
sensors and instruments, which it deploys for its safe passage, and other vessels
that may accompany it. These sensors may permit the collection of even more
substantial amounts of possibly sensitive data. For example, the radar range of
an aircraft-carrier battle group is substantially increased by the use of aerially
mounted radar, and such aircraft may be incidents of normal mode. A coastal
state may well take a very different view on the legitimacy of deploying
sophisticated radar aircraft in its national airspace, even for a short period.
For archipelagic sealanes passage, essentially the same rules used in the
context of transit passage are prescribed, although the area in which this type of
passage can be accessed is regulated. Archipelagic sealanes passage must be in
a designated lane, or failing such designation, in a route used by international
navigation through the archipelago. As with transit passage, 'normal mode' is
permissible, and such passage cannot be impeded or suspended. The right to
24
25

See M H Nordquist, United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982: A
Commentary (vol 2, 1993) 342-48.
For a discussion of normal mode see J Astley, 'The Law of the Sea and Naval
Operations' (1997) 42 Air Force Law Review 119, 134-35; R J Grunawalt, 'United
States Policy on International Straits' (1987) 18 Ocean Development and
InternationalLaw 445; D G Stephens, 'The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime NavallMilitary Operations' (1999) 19
California Western InternationalLaw Review 283, 290-91.
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archipelagic sealanes passage is only available in lanes, and if a vessel is
outside a lane, it is entitled to pass through archipelagic waters under a right of
innocent passage.
With respect to archipelagic sealanes passage, the issues discussed for
transit passage are the same, although magnified by the circumstances of some
archipelagos. While an aircraft-carrier battle group may pass through an
international strait within a matter of hours, passage down an archipelagic
sealane may take days, and therefore represent a much greater risk to the state
whose waters the ships pass. Further, such waters may be far-less confined, as
in the case of the waters of the Indonesian archipelago, where the benefit of a
50-mile-wide lane, or the use of undesignated sealanes, give transiting vessels
great scope for surveillance while in their normal mode.
The legality of intelligence gathering by vessels and aircraft in the territorial
sea raises a number of interesting questions. In the context of vessels,
exercising a right of innocent passage through the territorial'sea, it is clear that a
vessel must only undertake activities that are incidental to its safe navigation,
and not to engage in activities that are 'prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State'. Aircraft have no right of innocent passage, but
only rights of transit and archipelagic sealanes passage.
The situation for vessels and aircraft lends itself to potentially greater width
in the context of transit and archipelagic sealanes passage. In these cases, the
wider interpretation of normal mode would permit a flag state to collect not
merely data that was incidental to safe navigation, but to operate equipment and
sensors that would normally be used in the operation of the vessel or aircraft.
Obviously, such equipment must not be operated in a manner that prejudices
the security of the coastal state, but it clearly would give a transiting vessel a
much wider range of options in respect of intelligence gathering. The
Convention would seem to permit passive intelligence gathering as a
consequence of the provisions, as a coastal state would be unable to ascertain
what material the ship or its aircraft might have obtained, and is explicitly
unable to take steps against the ship to ascertain what might have been
26
collected.

Navigation Beyond National Sovereignty
Beyond the territorial sea, the Law of the Sea Convention also confirms there is
freedom of navigation for all vessels. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.

26

Sovereign immunity is explicitly retained in the Law of the Sea Convention in a
number of provisions. Art 32 provides that in the context of the regime of innocent
passage: 'With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30
and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.' The exceptions referred
to only require a vessel to be asked to leave a coastal state's territorial sea, and
responsibility be attributed to the flag state for harm caused.
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Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under
international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also
with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in
the Area.
The impact of this provision finds its way into the regime of the EEZ by
virtue of article 58, which expressly incorporates rights of freedom of
navigation and overflight.
The issue of military activities, including surveillance, in the EEZ of
27
another state is one not directly dealt with in the Law of the Sea Convention.
While the 'Convention makes it plain that military exercises and weaponry
testing in the territorial sea of a coastal state would be contrary to the regime of
innocent passage, there is no equivalent restriction articulated with respect to
other maritime zones. However, neither is there any authorisation with respect
to such exercises, with there being no inclusion of military exercises or related
activities in the list of freedoms.
The lack of direct reference to military activities is not fatal to the case for
the conduct of surveillance in the EEZ of another state. The rights listed in
article 87(1) are by no means an exhaustive list, and are merely specifically
enunciated examples. This is explicit in the use of the phrase 'inter alia'.
Further, the freedoms of the high seas are described as being subject to the
conditions set down in the Convention and 'other rules of international law'.
The use of this language makes it clear that the Law of the Sea Convention is
not intended to be the only source of law in relation to the use of the high seas
or EEZ.
If the case for freedom to undertake military surveillance in another state's
EEZ can be made, it is clearly subject to some qualification. For this, the crux
of the issue, is the meaning of the phrase 'with due regard'. This qualification is
applied to high-seas freedoms generally in article 87(2), and it would seem
logical that one must have due regard to the rights of others while navigating
28
through the EEZ.
27

28

Eg see G V Galdoresi and A G Kaufman, 'Military Activities in the Exclusive
Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict' (2002) 32
California Western Journal of International Law 253; see also D Letts, 'Recent
Australian Experience of the Law of the Sea and Military Operations' this volume.
See F Francioni, 'Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law
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Undertaking surveillance of another state from that state's EEZ would not,
in the ordinary course of events, be without due regard for other ships or
aircraft. In the case of a ship, the act of navigating safely, with data-gathering
sensors deployed would not necessarily interfere with other vessels' use of the
waters, unless the use of a sensor, such as a towed array, in some way impeded
fishing or navigation. With aircraft, it is submitted that the prospect of such
inconvenience is even more unlikely.
One issue that could be relevant in assessing the legality of military
surveillance from the EEZ, or high seas, relates to whether such surveillance
might constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Law of the Sea
Convention provides limited assistance through article 88, which provides:
'The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.'
A wide reading of this provision would, in theory, see great limitation of the
uses of warships on the high seas, and the potential circumscription on
intelligence gathering. When read with the Preamble, which invokes the
29
Convention's role in the furtherance of peace and security in the world, it
suggests that only peaceful uses of the sea are permissible. By extension this
could be drawn into the EEZ, as article 58 adopts the high-seas freedoms in the
Convention, and explicitly includes article 88 in this list. 30 Similarly, the
provisions with respect to marine scientific research under part XIII of the
Convention indicate that marine scientific research can only be undertaken for
peaceful purposes. 3 1 A case could be made that military surveillance from the
high seas or another state's EEZ was incompatible with the Law of the Sea
Convention.
32
Such an interpretation has not been favoured by many states or publicists.
The San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which sought to update and

consolidate the law of armed conflict at sea, makes it clear that armed conflict
at sea can take place on the high seas, and in certain circumstances in the EEZ

29

of the Sea' (1985) 18 Cornell International Law Journal 203, 215. See also
Nordquist, above n 24, 553-65.

The Preamble states in part: 'Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual
understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware
of the historic significance of.this Convention as an important contribution to the
maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world, ... ' and
'Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea
achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security,

co-operation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the

30
31
32

principles of justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social
advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter.'
Galorisi and Kaufman, above n 27, 275-78.
Art 240, Law of the Sea Convention, above n 12 provides: 'In the conduct of
marine scientific research the following principles shall apply: (a) marine
scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes.'
On this point see D J Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in InternationalLaw
(1987) 75; F Orrego Vicuna, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Nature
under International Law (1989) 110-13; Galdorisi and Kaufmann, above n 27,
274-76.
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of a neutral state. 33 The Manual states that belligerents must have due regard to
the uses to which another state may wish to put its EEZ and thus avoid damage
to the coastal state. Clearly, if armed conflict can occur in another state's EEZ,
it is difficult to assert that surveillance conducted in a passive way is contrary to

international law.
First, such an interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the regime
of innocent passage that is applicable to warships. Any warship may constitute
a danger to states in its vicinity. By its very nature, such a ship is designed to
engage in, or to assist other ships to engage in armed conflict. It may be
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a transiting warship has
activated passive sensors, and certainly inconsistent with international law to
stop and board such a vessel to ascertain this, given the sovereign immune
34
status of the vessel.
None of the above analysis undermines the legitimacy of the voyages
intended to be a threat to international peace as unlawful. Certainly, a ship
purporting to exercise a right of innocent passage that was in another state's
territorial sea for the purpose of intelligence gathering as a prelude to armed
conflict would not be consistent with the Convention. An argument could also
be made that a similar voyage that remained in the EEZ might also be unlawful,
as its intention was to assist a manifestly unlawful act. However, in such a case
it is the wider behaviour and motivation that would render such a journey
unlawful, not the actual act of navigation itself. Consequently, routine
intelligence-gathering flights or voyages through another state's EEZ would not
of themselves be illegal, unless they formed a prelude to an unauthorised attack
on another state.

The Downing of the US Navy EP-3E Aries
On 1 April 2001, there was a mid-air collision off the southern coast of China
between an aircraft of the People's Republic of China, a F-8-II 'Finback'
fighter aircraft, and an American EP-3E Aries aircraft. The Chinese fighter
crashed into the sea, resulting in the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei. The American
EP-3E was severely damaged, and ultimately made an emergency landing at
Lingshui airfield on Hainan Island in China. The aircrew of the American
aircraft were arrested, and the incident sparked a diplomatic crisis. Thirteen
days later the aircrew were released, as was the aircraft in June 2001, when it
35
was airlifted from China by a leased Russian Antonov cargo aircraft.

33
34

35

L Doswald-Beck (ed), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea (1995) [101.
The issue of sovereign immunity within the territorial sea was considered above
n 26. Other provisions also support sovereign immunity for warships and
government vessels on non-commercial service beyond the territorial sea.
Arts 42(5) and 236 explicitly refer to the doctrine with approval. In terms of
intervention beyond the territorial sea, there is nothing to suggest the immunity of
a warship is diluted in any way.
The incident is described in S D Murphy (ed), 'Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law' (2001) 95 American Yearbook of
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The collision followed a series of close passes and shadowing of American
EP-3Es by Chinese fighters. The fighters were attempting to deter the American
aircraft from.passing close to the Chinese coast, and utilise the EP-3E's highly
sophisticated intelligence-gathering capabilities. China regarded the flights as
essentially 'spy flights' and considered them contrary to international law. The
United States' attitude was the aircraft were in international airspace, and
therefore were exercising their freedom of overflight in international law. Both
states had been in dispute over similar flights for a considerable period of time
prior to this incident, with it being the regular practice of Chinese fighter pilots
in flying at extremely close range to American planes, ostensibly to deter them
from continuing. Several near misses had occurred during earlier flights prior to
the collision in this incident.
The collision between the United States and Chinese aircraft occurred in
international airspace as recognised by both states. 36 It also took place outside a
24-nautical-mile security zone claimed by China, but not recognised by the
United States. 3 7 While the EP-3E ultimately did enter Chinese national
airspace, and landed on Chinese territory, it was also not disputed by both states
that this incursion was motivated entirely by the distress the aircraft was in as a
result of the collision. The key issue in this context relates to the activities
undertaken by the aircraft prior to the collision.
The Chinese objection to the flights centred on their purpose. China
considered the activities as being overt intelligence gathering by another
military power, which were designed to provide detailed information that could
be used in any conflict. Such activities therefore, according to China,
undermined the international peace and security of the EEZ, and therefore were
not lawful. 38 The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry stated:
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InternationalLaw 626; see Galdorisi and Kaufmann, above n 27, 292-94; see also
<http://home.wxs.nl/-p3orion/hainan.html>.
China has proclaimed territorial sea baselines, which the United States has
protested. The incident occurred more than 12 nautical miles from the Chinese
baselines, so that its occurrence in international airspace was not in dispute. The
baselines were proclaimed in 1996: Declaration of the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial sea, (15 May 1996)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN
_1996_Declaration.pdf>. The American protest is cited in Naval War College,
Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations(1997) 1-77.

Art 13 of the' Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (25 February
1992) provides that the Chinese exercise jurisdiction over security within the
contiguous zone. This is rejected by the United States as inconsistent with art 33
of the Law of the Sea Convention, which has no reference to a security jurisdiction
in respect of the contiguous zone. The 1992 US protest is cited in Naval War
College, above n 36, 1-90.
A statement from the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC noted: 'The
surveillance flight conducted by the US aircraft overran the scope of "free
overflight" according to international law. The move also violated the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which stipulates that any flight in
airspace above another nation's exclusive economic zone should respect the rights
of the country concerned. Thus, the US plane's actions posed a threat to the
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The act of the US side constitutes a violation of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides, among other things, that the sovereign
rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State over its Exclusive Economic Zone,
particularly its right to maintain peace, security and good order in the waters of
the Zone, shall all be respected and that a country shall conform to the UNCLOS
and other rules of international law when exercising its freedom of the high
39
seas.
For China, the collision that subsequently occurred was the result of an
unlawful and unwanted activity, which the Chinese aircraft, like others before
them, were doing their best to deter without the use of force.
The United States' view was that any activity that occurs in international
airspace should be treated as legal, unless it involves hostilities against another
friendly power. The use of passive systems to collect information from an area
not subject to national jurisdiction is therefore entirely legitimate. The action by
the Chinese pilots in flying at close range to American aircraft in international
airspace was reckless, and endangered their lives as well as the lives of the EP3E, pilots, as was tragically demonstrated on 1 April 2001.
While the Chinese objections are understandable, and in other
circumstances intelligence-gathering flights could be a provocative prelude to
an armed conflict, the American position probably more closely reflects the
current content of international law. Freedom of navigation in international
airspace is not regulated, at least for state aircraft. If there is no restriction on
the flight path of such an aircraft, it is not tenable to restrict the use of sensors
on board. To forbid its movement on the basis of its status as a military state
aircraft would be detrimental to freedom of navigation, even on the high seas,
which is manifestly not the intention of the Convention, state practice or the ICJ
40
in the Corfu Channel Case.

Conclusion
The gathering of intelligence from the sea and air raises difficult questions for
the international community. The Law of the Sea Convention largely avoids
issues surrounding military activities. This is both an indication of the tension
surrounding these issues, and avoidance itself has created difficulties. States
have sought to assert restrictions, and these in turn present a risk to the
international community. Incidents such as the downing of the US EP-3E raise
international tensions and increase the likelihood of international conflict. The
international community should endeavour to clarify the rights and duties of
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national security of China.' <http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/9585.html>.
Chinese Ministry of Affairs Press Release (3 April 2001) <http://www.fmnprc.
gov.cn/eng/9607.html>.
Ivan Shearer himself recognised this as the logical outcome of the Chinese
argument in an unpublished paper presented to a conference organised by the
Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law at the University of Melbourne in February
2002: I A Shearer, 'Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case
of Aerial Surveillance', February 2002. Cited in Galorisi and Kaufman, above
n 27, 293.

Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security

states in the context of navigation and intelligence gathering, to avoid incidents
such as that in the South China Sea occurring.
Such clarification would also end the international debate surrounding the
claimed security zones of many states. These zones claimed to require entering
warships to give periods of notice, and an obligation to seek permission to
enter, are asserted by a number of states. Clearly intelligence gathering, or even
loitering in the waters just beyond a coastal state's territorial sea would fall foul
of some of these zones, and some degree of clarity to indicate their legality or
otherwise would be useful. At present, while the Convention does not authorise
security zones, with the exception of a 500-metre safety zone around offshore
installations, 4 1 there is no clear prohibition on such activities. Prohibition can
be inferred from the rights granted elsewhere, as illustrated above. The need to
clarify rights and obligations will only serve to reduce potential tension and
misunderstanding between states.
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These tiny zones are for navigational safety as much as anything else. See art 60,
Law of the Sea Convention, above n 12.

